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I.

THE CHILDREN ATTEMPT TO PREJUDICE THE COURT
AGAINST BARBARA.
Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson Drew Uzelac (the "Children") have cited

numerous facts and misstatements of facts1 in their brief that have no relevance to the
issues before the Court. Among other allegations, the Children cite out of context: (i)
unrelated proceedings below, ultimately falsely claiming that Barbara B. Uzelac
("Barbara") lost all of those matters; (ii) the number of attorneys that have appeared for
Barbara in this matter; (iii) that Barbara was sanctioned; (iv) how Louis and Barbara
handled their finances during their marriage; (v) Barbara's win/loss record on her first
appeal (inaccurately); and (vi) without citation to record evidence, the amount the estate
allegedly paid defending Barbara's claims (more than $200,000.00). "Brief of
Intervenors/Cross Appellants" ("Children's Brief) at 7-9, 27-30, 27 Fn.18, 30, Fn.20.
From these and similar allegations, the Children argue that Barbara "forced" the estate to
pay these legal fees. Id. at 30. They allege that Barbara is trying "to reach back four (4)
years and into her deceased husbandfs premarital property to pay a devise she could have
received in 1999." Id. at 12. There is no evidence that Barbara was offered any

1

See, e.g., Children's Brief at 15 (Claiming Barbara asserted her status as a
creditor for the first five years of the litigation); compare T. 1, 12, 130 (Personal
representative's counsel stated, in the presence of the Children and their counsel and
without correction or objection: "The facts will show that the idea of [Barbara] being a
creditor was raised for the first time three months ago, in July of 2003; two-and-a-half
years too late").
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settlement, much less $230,660.90, in 1999.2 In the final analysis, the Children have
made no argument that directly uses these and similar allegations in support of the legal
principles involved in this appeal.
In their "(Errata) Intervenors' Brief on Remand" (the "Children's Remand Brief),
the Children called Barbara "the proverbial raccoon with her hand in the cookie jar." Id.
at 10; R. 1588. Irrelevant, pejorative, personal attacks have no place in arguments before
this Court. Nonetheless, those attacks have been made.
Accordingly, Barbara responds: (i) She knew Louis for twenty-eight years before
their marriage; (ii) During that twenty-eight-year period, she was a good friend of Louis'
first wife through their twice monthly bridge club meetings; (iii) Through the bridge
club's annual Christmas parties and other socials, she and Louis became friends; (iv)
After their respective spouses died in the early 1970?s, Louis and Barbara were married in
April 1976; (v) Barbara and Louis were happily married for more than twenty-three years
until Louis' death in November 1999; and (vi) the Children have received both their
devise and Barbara's in 2003. R.1413; October 7, 2003 Trial Transcript at 18-21
(hereafter "T."); Trial Exh. 2 at 1; Trial Exhibit 21.
Barbara has pursued this litigation because Louis wanted her to receive
$230,660.90 upon his death, Barbara did not receive it, and Barbara wants and needs this

2

The Children's calculation of the amount of cash available to pay Barbara, even
after the sale of the adjacent lot, was less than Barbara's devise unless the homestead had
been sold. Id. at 26-27.
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money. The personal representative (Louis' brother and uncle of the Children, T. 110)
and now the Children have fought ever issue with tenacity to deprive Barbara of the
benefits Louis intended for her. Indeed, allegedly spending over $200,000 to fight a devisee
is tenacious, improvident, and a breach of the personal representative's duty of loyalty and
impartiality. Utah Code §75-3-703; §75-7-802; §75-7-803.
Barbara will be eighty-one years old on July 17. T. at 91. By the time this matter
is remanded to the lower court, she will have lost approximately eight years of a more
peaceful and comfortable life. Even in victory, Barbara is already a loser. Barbara asks
the Court not to be swayed by the Children's emotional appeal; she is not, and never has
been, a "raccoon with her hand in the cookie jar."
II.

BARBARA IS A GENERAL PECUNIARY DEVISEE.
A.

Whether Barbara Did or Did Not Receive a General Devise Chargeable
to Specific Property Is Irrelevant; The Issue Remains: Was the Devise
Pecuniary?

In responding to Barbara's arguments that she is a general pecuniary devisee, the
Children do not address the substance of Barbara's analysis. Brief of Appellant
("Barbara's Brief) at 17-19. Instead, they claim for the first time on appeal3 that
Barbara's devise is "a general devise chargeable to specific property." Children's Brief at
13-15; compare Children's Remand Brief at 7-9, R.1585-87. But even had the Children

3

Determining whether or not the Children raised their issues on appeal with the
lower court required a careful review of their Remand Brief, because the Children never
cite to the Record showing where their issues had been preserved for appeal.
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raised this issue on remand, the Children's analysis does not affect the issue of whether
Barbara's devise is a general pecuniary devise or a general devise. Assuming Barbara's
devise was a general devise chargeable to specific property, since the property identified
by the Children as the designated source of the devise is no longer available to pay
Barbara, the devise would be treated as a general devise in any event. Ulah Code §75-3902(1) (text following (l)(d)). Even under the Children's interpretation, the issue
remains: is Barbara's devise a general pecuniary devise? A general devise chargeable to
specific property can be a general pecuniary devise if the property has been lost or
dissipated. For example, Comment c to the Restatement identifies a devise of "$1,000
payable from my bank account" as a general devise charged to specific property. See
Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 5.1 (1999), Comment c. If the
bank account were closed at the decedent's death, the devisee receives a general
pecuniary devise.
To resolve whether or not Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee does not require
a contorted analysis of the Antenuptial Agreement and the Will. Children's Brief at 1316, 28-30. It does not require the Court to add words to the Antenuptial Agreement or the
Will. Id. Rather the issue is: What is the result of Louis' decision to incorporate by
reference the Antenuptial Agreement into his Will? Trial Exh. 4 at 1; Utah Code §75-2510. If, as a result of Louis' decision to incorporate the Antenuptial Agreement into his
will, Barbara receives a specific amount of money, then Louis' decision makes Barbara a
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general pecuniary devisee. Even the Children would have to agree that $230,660.90 is a
pecuniary amount. Children's Brief at 14. That is precisely what has happened here and
that is why Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee.
B.

The Calculation of Barbara's Devise after Louis' Date of Death Does
Not Change the Character of the General Pecuniary Devise.

The Children also claim: "Obviously, interest is not properly assessed on monetary
devises if the amount cannot be ascertained until the net probate estate is determined and
all claims are paid." Id. Were this true, it would be a shock to estate planners who use
"pecuniary formula" provisions in wills and trusts to maximize estate tax savings. See
generally, Richard V. Covey, "The Marital Deduction and the Use of Formula
Provisions," Bobbs-Merrill (2nd Ed. 1978).4 The "pecuniary formula" computes the
pecuniary amount based upon laws, facts, and circumstances in existence at the time of
the decedent's death. Because the calculation is generally made as part of the preparation
of the estate tax return, it usually takes from six to fifteen months before the pecuniary
amount is set.5 Nonetheless, these pecuniary formulas are general pecuniary devises. As
stated in the Comment to the Restatement:
A pecuniary devise can state a sum of money or state a formula from which
a sum of money is derived. A pecuniary amount derived by formula is often
4

In 1978, Mr. Covey referred to pecuniary formula provisions as "true legacies."
See Id. at 20-23.
5

Six months is the final date for calculating values based on the alternate
valuation date. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2032(a)(2). With one six month extension, fifteen months
is normally the cut off date for filing the estate tax return. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6075(a).
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used in tax clauses, such as a devise of "the smallest pecuniary amount that,
if allowed as a federal estate tax marital deduction, would result in the least
possible federal estate tax being payable by reason of my death," or a devise
of "the largest pecuniary amount, if any, that will not increase the federal
estate taxes payable by reason of my death."
Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 5.1 (1999), Comment c. Thus,
the calculation of Barbara's devise post death does not affect its status as a general
pecuniary devise.
C.

Louis' Overall Purposes Show Barbara is a General Pecuniary Devisee.

With regard to the beneficiary status of Barbara and the Children, both parties
agree it "is a question of construction, on which the testator's overall purpose is relevant."
Id, Comment g; Children's Brief at 15. The Children acknowledge that Louis intended
Barbara to be a beneficiary of his Will, notwithstanding that he left to his Children "all of
my property real, personal or mixed, share and share alike." Children's Brief at 29.
However, in arguing that Louis did not intend Barbara to receive a general pecuniary
devise, the Children inaccurately claim that Barbara "contracted away" her right to Louis'
premarital property. In addition, they violate a fundamental principle of the law
governing the interpretation of contracts and wills; they add words to the Antenuptial
Agreement and the Will.
1.

As a Devisee, Barbara is Entitled to Payment from Louis' Estate.

The Children argue: "Barbara contracted her right to Louis1 premarital property
away in 1976." Children's Brief at 15. This claim permeates their Brief. See Id. at 12,
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16, 18, 28-30. However, this claim is inaccurate, because Barbara is seeking her share as
a devisee of Louis' Will. Paragraph one of the Antenuptial Agreement states:
In the event of the termination of this marriage by death or otherwise all of
the real, personal or mixed property owned by each party hereto prior to the
marriage shall be the sole and separate property of him and her or their
respective estates.
Trial Exh. 1 at 2,1fl. When Louis died, his premarital property became part of his estate,
exactly as required by the agreement. As a general pecuniary devisee (or a general
devisee), Barbara has a claim to payment of her devise from the estate's assets, whether
premarital or post marital. Utah Code §75-3-902(1). Nothing in the Antenuptial
Agreement precludes Barbara's devise from being paid by premarital property from
Louis' estate.6
2.

The Children Ask the Court to Change the Meaning of the
Agreement by Adding the Word "Marital" to Paragraph 5.

The Children argue that the devise to Barbara "per the terms of paragraph 5" of the
Antenuptial Agreement was a devise of "marital property." Id at 13-16, 28-30. The
Children's methodology mimics what the trial court did in its first decision. In re Estate
ofUzelac, ffljl5-21, No. 20040356-CA, 114 P.3d 1164, 526 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 2005 UT
App 234 (Utah App. 2005) (reversing trial court's addition of the word "together" after
"all property . . . acquired by the parties"). Children's Brief at 28-30.

6

The trial court stated: "neither party had a claim to the other's pre-marital
property." R.1750, ^[1. Barbara is not claiming against Louis' pre-marital property.
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This is the first time the Children have alleged that paragraph five of the
Antenuptial Agreement refers only to "marital property." See Children's Remand Brief at
1-11, R. 1579-89. The Children want to limit the meaning of "all property . . . acquired"
by adding the word "marital" before "property." The trial court attempted to limit the
meaning of this phrase by adding the word "together" after "acquired." In the Court of
Appeals decision, the trial court's addition of "together" was reversed because "all
property . . . acquired by the parties" would include property of every type that could be
acquired however acquired. Uzelac, supra, ^ 19. Had Louis or Barbara inherited assets
during the marriage, that property would have fallen within "all property . , . acquired"
during the marriage, even though under divorce law, inheritances are normally treated as
"separate" property. Hall v. Hall 858P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, it is
a cardinal principle of contract interpretation in Utah, that courts do not "add, ignore, or
discard words in this process [of interpretation]." Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp., 548
P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976). Thus, the property described in paragraph five of the
Antenuptial Agreement included all property of every kind, whether marital or separate.
3.

The Children Want to Change the meaning of the Will by
Adding the Word "Separate."

A devise of "all my property, real, mixed or personal" has been used for centuries
to show the testator is leaving every property of every kind to the designated beneficiary.
See e.g. Estate ofAshton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 541-43 (Utah App. 1990) (interpreting
similar language to constitute a devise of the "entire estate . . . in fee simple"). It is not,
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as the Children claim, a devise of only Louis' separate property. That result can only be
reached by adding the word "separate" before properly, and that is not permitted in Utah.
Auerbach v. Samuels, 9 Utah 2d 261, 266, 342 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1959) (requiring an
unambiguous will to be interpreted from its "four corners").
Louis' choice of words in his Will discloses his overall purpose. Louis is
presumed to have known the law and its effects on his Will and Codicil at the time he
executed them. Wallich v. Wallick 10 Utah 2d 192, 195, 350 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1960)
(in interpreting a will, the Court presumed the testator knew the provisions of the antilapse statute and how it would impact his will.) Both the Will and the Codicil were
prepared after the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in Utah in 1977. Thus,
Louis is presumed to know that Barbara was entitled to be a creditor of the estate who
would receive payment prior to any payment to any other beneficiary. Utah Code §75-3805(1) (1977) and §75-3-807(1977). In preparing his Will, Louis chose language that
supports this conclusion. To the Children he stated: "I give, devise and bequeath . . . to
my children . . . all of my property, real, mixed, and personal." Trial Exh. 4 at 1. But, to
Barbara, he stated: "she is to receive per the terms of our anti [sic] nuptial agreement
dated March 26, 1976

" Id. In addition, Louis is further presumed to know that if his

personal representative delayed payment to Barbara beyond the statutory time limit, then
Barbara would be entitled to interest at the legal rate on the amount to which she was
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entitled that was not paid. Utah Code §75-3-806(4) (1977).7 Finding that Barbara is a
general pecuniary devisee, entitled to interest at the legal rate, is consistent with Louis'
presumed and actual intent.

The only distinction between (i) Barbara's status as a

general pecuniary devisee and (ii) what her status would have been as a creditor is the
date interest payments begin. Compare Utah Code §75-3-806(4) (creditor claim) (1992)
with §75-3-904 (general pecuniary devisee).
Interest at the legal rate is granted because the person entitled to the payment has
had to wait to receive payment. Barbara has waited close to seven and a half years to
receive any payment, and will likely have to wait for another six to twelve months before
she receives payment. Where the amount payable under Louis' will is a dollar amount, it
is fair, reasonable, and legally correct to rule that Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee
entitled to interest at the legal rate from December 7, 2000 "until payment" is made. Utah
Code §75-3-904.
III.

THE CHILDREN ARE RESIDUARY BENEFICIARIES.
Like Barbara's status as a beneficiary, Barbara and the Children agree that Louis'

overall purpose is relevant to the beneficiary status of the Children, but they again disagree
on what that purpose was. Whether the Children are residuary devisees or general
devisees affects abatement; if the Children are residuary devisees only their devise will

7

In 1977, the statutory time limit was three months following the end of the
publication notice period. In 1992, Section 75-3-806(4) was amended so that the
statutory period ends six months following death. See Laws 1992, c. 179, § 8.
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abate to pay Barbara's devise; if they are general devisees, Barbara's devise and the
Children's devise will abate to pay Barbara's devise. Utah Code §75-3-902(1).
The Children chose not to respond to Barbara's analysis with regard to what would
happen if there were no residuary devisee and a devise were to lapse. Barbara's Brief at
21-22. Because Louis is presumed to know the law, Wallich, 10 Utah 2d at 195, 350 P.2d
at 616, he logically intended his devise of "all of my property" to act as residuary devise,
exactly as the personal representative acknowledged in his Post Trial Brief. See Barbara's
Brief at 20-21. Otherwise, Barbara could have received lapsed devises as Louis' sole heir
up to $50,000 and as a joint heir thereafter. Barbara's Brief at 21-22. Barbara inheriting
assets not distributed in Louis' will is contrary to the words Louis actually used in his
Will. Trial Exh. 4 at 1. Similarly, Louis intent regarding Barbara's rights, that they
precede any other beneficiary, also supports this analysis. See discussion supra at 7-10.
In contrast, the Children rely on Comment c to Section 5.1 of the Restatement
(Third) of Property. Id. at 15. Barbara has previously addressed this issue. Barbara' Brief
at 19-23.
As noted, the Children need the Court to rewrite paragraph five of the Antenuptial
Agreement (adding the word "marital") and to rewrite Louis' Will (adding the word
"separate"). Children's Brief at 15,28-30. While the meaning of the Antenuptial
Agreement is relevant, it is Louis' overall purpose in his Will in incorporating the
Antenuptial Agreement by reference that controls. The Children have not provided any
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logical reason that Louis' overall purpose was to treat them as general devisees, while
Barbara's analysis has established that Louis intended his children, as the recipients of "all
my property," to be Louis' residuary devisees. Thus, the Court should reverse the trial
court's legal conclusion that the devise to the Children is a general devise.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
RETURNED TO THE ESTATE.
Barbara attaches the current property tax report for the two parcels that comprise

the homestead. See www.assessor.slco.org (Salt Lake County Assessor) for two parcels
with tax identification number 2215103005 and 2215103006; Trial Exh. 21 (Deed of
Distribution, showing tax identification numbers for the two parcels comprising the
homestead). Barbara attaches a copy of each report as Exhibit A to this Brief.
These two parcels have a property value of $961,330 for the land, and $193,370 for
the home and other structures. Thus, the total property tax value of the property that
Barbara wants to recover and sell to pay her devise is $1,154,700.
The Children assert four legal theories for affirming the trial court's decision to
refuse recovery of the homestead. None of those theories challenge Barbara's analysis
directly. Instead, the Children claim first that Barbara's possessory interest in the
homestead precludes a sale of the homestead to pay Barbara's devise. Id. at 18-19.
Second, they assert that Barbara's original appeal of the September 27, 2003 Minute Entry
was untimely. Id. at 19-24. Next, they argue that any motion that Barbara would file now
is time barred. Id. at 24-25. Finally, they argue that the trial court did not have in
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personam jurisdiction over the Children at the time of the Court's decision on the
September 27, 2003. Id, at 26-27. None of these arguments have merit
The trial court ruled that Barbara's motion was procedurally defective because: (i)
it was not a "proceeding" against the Children; and (ii) Barbara's identification of herself
as a creditor rather than a devisee did not give the Children notice of Barbara's claim that
she wanted the property returned. Trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
at6,H6;R.1755.
The trial court's reasons and the Children's arguments are logically barred by the
prior appeal. Barbara specifically appealed the September 27, 2003 Order (R. 1366-67),
and the Court of Appeals, after having determined that Barbara could not proceed as a
creditor, nonetheless vacated and remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider
Barbara's motion after the trial court determined the amount to which Barbara was entitled
as a devisee under Louis' Will. Uzelac, supra at ^[20-21. The trial court and Children
find Barbara's motion defective, when the Court of Appeals impliedly found it was not.
While the Children did not need to intervene in these proceedings,8 their
intervention does highlight one crucial point: As intervenors, the Children must take the
case as they find it at the time of intervention. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 285

8

They that had already participated in their capacity as "interested persons" in
different matters without intervention. R. 874-75; R.1243-1255. Utah Code §75-3-105.
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(Utah 1982). Thus, any claim that was or could have been resolved in the first appeal may
not be raised by the Children now.
A.

Barbara's Possessory Interest Can Be Reclaimed at Any Time.

Under Utah law, the property devised to a devisee "devolves" to the devisee
immediately upon the decedent's death, but it does so "subject to administration'' Utah
Code §75-3-701; Miter of Estate ofWagley, 760 P.2d 316, 317 (Utah 1988). The effect
of this provision is that there is no immediate possessory interest in any beneficiary, and
beneficiaries have only a limited right to keep possession of estate assets that are in their
possession at the time of the decedent's death. Utah Code §75-3-708. Under Section 753-708, if the personal representative demands return of estate property in the possession of
a beneficiary, it is "conclusively presumed" the personal representative needs the property
"for purposes of administration." Id. The beneficiary must return the property.9 Were this
not so, there would often be no way to pay creditors of the estate or handle abatement
issues that can arise.10 Thus, while the personal representative is directed generally to

9

The Children also assert that Barbara obtained her life estate as a result of the
trial Court's order in December 2001. R. 13 8-41. The Court did not order the life estate
distributed to Barbara. It simply declared her interest was a determinable life estate and it
itemized her responsibilities as a life tenant in possession of the estate property. See also
Utah Code §75-3-708 (duties of personal representative to maintain estate property only
when the personal representative has possession).
10

There is always abatement to some extent. Any expenses paid will deprive the
beneficiaries of the assets used to pay those expenses. A general devise will cause a
residuary devise to abate. Utah Code §75-3-902(1). Because these charges normally fall
on the residuary taker(s), the abatement generally goes unnoticed.
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make distributions in kind, those distributions are made only "to the extent possible."
Utah Code §75-3-906(1). In addition, the Code grants the personal representative the
specific power to sell assets of the estate, a power that would be meaningless under the
Children's view of Utah probate law. Utah Code §75-3-714(6).
1.

Bob Jones' Property Would be Sold.

Contrary to the Children's conclusion, their "Bob Jones" example would lead to the
sale of the property in which Bob Jones had a life estate. Children's Brief at 19. If the
will had a general devise to another devisee ("D") charged to specific property, if the
specific property has been lost or dissipated, if there is only one parcel of property in the
estate (with Bob Jones' life estate), and if D requests that the property be sold to pay D's
devise, a prudent personal representative would sell the property because the personal
representative has a duty to follow the provisions of the probate code, has a duty of loyalty
and impartiality to the devisees, and cannot favor one devisee over another. Utah Code
§75-3-703; §75-7-802; §75-7-803.n
As explained below, the prudent personal representative in selling the property
would respect Bob Jones' rights as the life tenant. However, when the personal
representative discovers that the devise to D cannot otherwise be paid, the Personal

11

In the "Bob Jones" example, the Children did not discuss how the remainder
interests devolved to them. The remainder (R) cannot receive the property through a
specific devise. In that event both Bob Jones' life estate and R's remainder interest
would be specific devises and those would not abate. Utah Code §75-3-902(1 )(d).
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Representative proceeds to take whatever steps are necessary to sell the property. Utah
Code §75-3-703; §75-7-802; §75-7-803; §75-3-714(6).
2.

What Happens when Bob Jones is Not in Possession.

If Bob Jones is not in possession of the property, and if no deed of distribution has
been executed, the personal representative would sell the property. The personal
representative would pay the value of the life estate to the life tenant without reduction
because the life tenant is a specific devisee. See Barbara's Damage Memorandum on
remand at 15-17; R. 1638-40 (explaining how this is done using methodology developed by
the Internal Revenue Service). The balance of the sales proceeds would be used to pay
D's general devise and then R's interest. Abatement of D's devise would be handled
according to the provisions of Section 75-3-902 as required under the circumstances. Utah
Code §75-3-902(1).
3.

What Happens if Bob Jones Is In Possession.

If Bob Jones were in possession of the property, the personal representative would
request that possession be returned to the estate. As noted above, Bob Jones must comply.
Utah Code §75-3-708. If he complies, the personal representative would then proceed to
sell the property as provided above. If Bob Jones refused to return possession to the
personal representative, the personal representative would move the probate court to order
Bob Jones to deliver possession to the personal representative, and the probate court would
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proceed as outlined above.
4.

What Happens if the Property Has Been Distributed,

If a deed of distribution had been executed in favor of Bob Jones and R, the
personal ivpivseiihln i n mild i n n> n lln; ptopiTh usinji tin |inv • i uiaiiilnl in Sot tin mi i

75-3-105, 75-3-909, and 75-3-1004. Once recovered, the personal representative would
proceed as outlined above.
5.

Conclusion

\\ hill Ihr ChiMivn ask (lit I mill In ulln lis i milnil pinbiilc U\\\ so I III ill R.ii'biiiii ilnno •

will be denied any benefit from her devise. In their view, the personal representative may
fight one devisee for the benefit of another, favored devisee, use the non-favored devisee's
devise to fund the fight, and then advise the non-favored devisee, "we had to use your
de\ ise to pay for the litigation against] • c i J "

»

contrary to the personal representative's duty to administer a probated will according to its
terms and "in accordance with the provisions of the probate code." Utah Code §75-3Weortijinj'h , lln: ( 'mill 'ihoiihl n \\ 11 Ilu1 I "hililicii s Jiii'iniient,
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B.

•

'. . .

Barbara Is Not Barred from Recovery of the Distributed Property by
Either Section 75-3-412 or by this Court's Decision in Matter of Estate of
Morrison.

11 le Children argue that an adjudication of any separate probate proceeding is a
I mi11 ill ii'iilri I oi i|piii| ,isr> til a|)]H .ill fiiunj. 1 upon Si clnin "J \ \ II II " iiill lln probate < IMII
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Children's Brief at 20-22. However, Section 75-3-412 only applies to "a formal testacy
order under this part — " Utah Code §75-3-412 (emphasis added). Part 4 of Chapter 3,
comprising Sections 75-3-401 through 75-3-414, applies to "Formal Testacy and
Appointment Proceedings." Utah Code, Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 4. None of the orders
entered that are in dispute were entered under the provisions of Part 4. Barbara has never
contested Louis' will; rather, she relies on it for her relief in this matter.
Beyond this, the Children argue that the September 27, 2003 minute entry was a
final appealable order relying on this Court's decision in Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d
1015, 1017-18, 311 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 1997). In Morrison, this Court stated
that Utah Courts have adopted a "pragmatic, case-by-case approach to [determining]
finality in probate matters." Id. at 1017-18. Under this rule, Utah appellate courts will
treat certain non-final, interim probate court orders as final for appellate purposes, //the
matter is of "vital importance," "removed a cloud of uncertainty," or "effectively end[ed
the case absent an appeal]." Id. at 1017. This rule makes sense when the issue before the
Court is whether or not to accept for appeal a non-final order12 based on the "case by case"
approach. If the Court decides the case does not have one of these factors, the appeal is
dismissed and the parties continue the case below.

12

If the appealed order were truly a final order, it would be appealable regardless
of its importance, etc.
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interim orders as part of an appeal of a final order would be exceptionally unfair and
unworkable. To use a "case by case" approach to deny appeals of interim orders as part of
an appeal < ,i a final order would make probate appeals dangerous and unjust, rhis case is
iilllnisliiiillii
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entry that the Children believe falls within the Morrison criteria. I o deny the right of
appeal based on the appellate court's later conclusion that the interim order had "vital
importance,' created "clouds of uncertainty, etc would be unfair and. unjust.' Here, the
("null vuiiild In1 tlni\ttn,» .in jpik'.il ol ,111 iiiluini oitki Hit liiiill court (ilkd" "MinuteEntry"
entered ten days prior to trial.
Moreover, the Children's proposal would create an administrative nightmare.
Conscientious attorneys in probate cases, aware of the risk of being second guesseu
ii i lpoi tance etc of an inter im :)i der. woi ilci file an appeal for each adverse interim •
decision. Since there in no procedure for a "notice of intent to appeal" as used in the past,
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1039 Fn.4 (Utah 1989) (discussing former
I'! uk ' 'lih ol Ilk1 I IK< I"! tat In .ipptiil ^oukl Ik litalal a\ ji) <ippr;il i m ill ill .in Ii iliiiit us lilt
reviewing appellate court decided the order would not be deemed final. Absent a
summary disposition, a decision to dismiss the appeal would happen after briefing and
probably after oral argument.
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For these reasons, the Children's argument is unjust and impracticable, and it
should be rejected.13
C.

Barbara is Not Seeking to File a New Motion; the Motion she did File is
Timely.

The Children misstate Barbara's argument by stating Barbara is claiming that "she
was never was required" to file a proceeding against the Children. Children's Brief at 19.
Barbara instead argued that the motion she did file was a proceeding against the Children.
Barbara's Brief at 13-17. With that false predicate, the Children argue any motion that
Barbara might file now would be time barred. Children's Brief at 24-25. That assertion is
actually false. The reasons given by the trial court and the Children for denying Barbara's
pending motion are not substantive. Thus, if Barbara's motion were dismissed on
procedural grounds, as an "independent proceeding" under Section 75-3-106, Barbara
would have one year to re-file an independent proceeding for recovery of the homestead.
Utah Code §78-12-40.
But Barbara is not seeking to file a new motion to recover the distributed property.
The distribution occurred on May 29, 2003 (Trial Exh. 21), and Barbara filed her timely
motion two months later on July 28, 2003. R.918-41; Utah Code §75-3-909, §75-3-1004,

13

Barbara's counsel faced this argument in a prior case. See Appellee's Brief in
Hughes v. Cafferty, 89 P.3d 148, 495 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2004 UT 22 (Utah 2004). The
Supreme Court did not need to reach this issue and so it provided no guidance. Even if a
decision on this point is dicta, Barbara's counsel believes it would be helpful dicta for
both the appellate courts and appellate counsel.
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defective, not that it was untimely. It erroneously held that Barbara's motion was filed
against the Estate, and not against the distributees. R.1755, ^|6; Barbara's Brief at 13-17.
Barbara s motion prayed that the Children be ordered to return the homestead to the estate.
I i n ' i i c l i o i i \\\v loi Iht l i c t i d i l ol lite rslah
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explained, she followed the correct procedure. Id.
The trial court further held Barbara's motion was defective because she only
identified herself as a creditor, and not as both a creditor and a devisee, ruling that '••..'
identify ingherself .is <i < ivdiloi ilnl nol pio\ u\v "noln c lo Ilk1 Ixiielkiaries ol \w\ i liiim
R. 1755, Tf6. The Children did not address this issue, although it would seem to be a
necessary prerequisite to their claims that a new motion would be untimely. See
CI lildi en's Brief at 18 29 I nt aixy e\ eiit, Barbara has already addressed this issue in her
Appellant's Brief. Barbara's Brief ;il Ii» I .
D.

The Trial Court Had in Rem Jurisdiction of the Homestead and in
Personam Jurisdiction over the Children.

Ill her appellant' s brief, Barbara has identified the probate code sections that permit
"interestedpersons'' lo ciisc

;HIII
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to other "interested persons." Barbara's Brief at 13-17. In the face of this analysis, the
Children claim, based solely on their status as residents of Nevada, the trial court lacked in
personam iniisilu'lhrii win n il » onsulcicd Barbara' s motion for recovery of the distributed
property. The Children are wrong on two coi ints I :' Ii sill: pi obate coi ii ts hai - e "in i c m' '
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jurisdiction of real property located in Utah. Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 17
Utah 2d 88, 89-90,404 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah 1965); accord Uniform Probate Code §3-101
(General Comment; preceding section). Accordingly, the probate court had jurisdiction to
order the title to the homestead returned to the estate. Without in personam jurisdiction
the Court could quiet title in the estate if necessary. Thus, the trial court did not need in
personam jurisdiction.
In any event, the trial court had in personam jurisdiction. Like all other
jurisdictions, Utah courts gain in personam jurisdiction of any party that appears generally
in any court proceeding. See Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1974). In
Barber, the Supreme Court found that the filing of an answer by nonresidents constituted a
general appearance, noting "an appearance by the defendant for any purpose except... to
object to jurisdiction . . . constitutes a general appearance." Id. at 702, Fn. 4. Having
appeared generally, the Children voluntarily submitted themselves to the trial court's in
personam jurisdiction. Thus, the Children remain subject to the in personam jurisdiction
of the trial court and this Court.
Barbara asks the Court to order the homestead returned to the Estate.

THE CHILDREN'S CROSS APPEAL
V.

THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE CHILDREN'S CROSS APPEAL FOR
FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE FACTS AND ON THE MERITS.
The Children identify their cross appeal issue as "Did the trial court correctly

calculate [the amount of Barbara's devise]" and their burden regarding the trial court's
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arguments: the court failed to include a deduction in its computation; and the Court
improperly calculated what assets were held at death14 They did not marshal the facts and
demonsti ate that those facts "cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial
court t'\rn WVP
1f9,
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144 P.3d 114;, 561 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 2006 UT 56 (Utah 2006). Nor did they follow

the procedure outlined in Chen v. Stewart even though they cited it regarding their burden
on appeal. < lien v Sternal 1fl| u Kil Il I I! Il I Il I I / .11 'I Il K a l i / " W l \ K c p "K ""DIM! I I I K J
.(Utah 2004) (explaining in detail marshaling, if \ purpose and what the court, expects when
a party marshals the facts). In addition, their Remand Brief did not include the allegedly
missing item when the Children discussed offsets. Children's Remand Brief at 8, R. 1566.
lied

•
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When the Children address their cross appeal (Children's Brief at 16-18), they
argue for the first time that the trial court did not follow the directions of the Court of
Appeals because the POD accounts owned by Louis were not "held at death." Children's
Brief Jill Id I H Ml Il i nil«, v> llln fin in in I nun i ml Inn (limr In si liiiiir MM .ipptai, il r < otiltan In
their Remand Brief. "POD accounts are . . . non-probate assets.... Ownership transferred
upon Lou's death." Children's Remand Brief at 9; R. 1586, ^}1.

14

Having conceded that

While it should not be relevant to this appeal, the Children falsely claim that
Barbara received all of the tangible personal property listed on Trial Exh 36 Compare
Children's Brief at 12 with T 101-105
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Louis held the assets at death, the Children may not now argue his ownership terminated
"immediately before death." See also R. 1366-67, TJ21 (trial court's initial finding Louis
held eight accounts at death, including the POD accounts); see also, Trial Exhibit 2,
Stipulation at 3-4,19.
In any event, the Children's position is legally incorrect. In support of their
argument, the Children cite Section 75-2-205, a probate code section that only applies to
the elective share provisions. Utah Code §75-2-201 (definitions "as used in this part");
Utah Code Title 75, Chapter 2, Part 2 "Elective Share of Surviving Spouse."
The controlling statutory provisions are contained in Sections 75-6-101 through 115
"Multiple Party Accounts." Those sections specifically address the rights of parties and
POD payees to "POD accounts". POD accounts are owned by the "party" or owner
(Louis) until death. The POD payee only obtains ownership by proving the fact of the
owner's death and the POD payee's identity. Utah Code §75-6-110. See also Utah Code
§75-6-101 (7)(a), (7)(b), (9), (10), and (11). Section 75-6-104(1), cited by the Children
addressing "joint accounts" not POD accounts, actually supports Barbara's point. Utah
Code §75-6-104(1). A dispute between an estate and a surviving joint tenant cannot arise
until the decedent has died. It does not arise "immediately before death."
For these reasons, the Court should not modify or reverse the trial court's
calculation of damages.
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CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Intent on keeping their unjust enrichment, the Children rely on pejorative comments
about Barbara in support of that goal. That should not be surprising to counsel or to the
Court.

Barbara, friend of I ,ouis for nearly 50 years, loving w i f e for o v e r 23 years,

in in iiuiith cii'hh nine UMTS oil ,U.H, d o r s IIIHHI! iindcrsljinil v\\\\ I niih intniitlol I'lllil In In i
had to pass through this gauntlet of irrelevant, unexplained, false, and misleading
statements of fact. Having not responded to each and every allegation as she would have
liked to ha\ e clone, Barbara asks the Coi n 1: to render a fair and just decision based on the
legal issues invoh eel
Accordingly, Barbara asks the Court to remedy seven years of injustice by:
• 1.
" ••' • . 2.
3.

Ordering the homestead to be reconveyed to the estate;
Ordei ing the homestead sold;

•• .

•• • • •

• '•

Ordering Barbara's life estate interest to be valued fairly, takiri:

;.

when the personal representative should have sold the life estate;
4.

Ordering the net proceeds of sale distributed to Barbara for her life estate

5.

Holding that Barbara is a general pecuniary devisee, entitled to interest as

directed by Section 75-3-904; and •.
6.

Holding that the Children are residuary devisees whose devise abates to pay

Barbara's general peci it liaiy de \ ise pi u: si lant tc Section 75 3- 9 0 2 .
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Dated this/ 2-day of March, 2007.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Charles M. Benftett
Attorneys for Barbara Uzelac
C \CMB WORK\UZELAC SECOND APPEAL\UZELAC-SECOND APPEAL-REPLY-BRJEF-3 10 07 wpd

Page 26

CERTIFICATE Ol SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S

10 lb.
REPLY BRIEF were mailed by first class to the following persons, this 1^ day of
March, 2007:
Margaret H. Olson
Hobbs& Olson
466 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
with one courtesy copy to:
Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr.
6476 E Shooting Star Way
Scottsdale, AZ 85262-7379

^m^^t^pnmL
\ j

Page 27

